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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In two recent cases, Montejo v. Louisiana1 and Maryland v. Shatzer,2 the 
Supreme Court has held, for the first time, that overt custodial government contact 
with a represented criminal defendant after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
has attached, initiated by law enforcement agents for the purpose of securing a 
Miranda waiver and obtaining a statement and without the consent or presence of the 
defendant’s lawyer, is constitutional in certain circumstances.  This change in the 
constitutional landscape has serious implications for the interpretation and 
enforcement of one of the bedrock rules of professional responsibility: the rule that 
lawyers are forbidden from making contact with represented adverse parties.3  It 
forces the question: Should the ethics rules be aligned with the constitutional rules in 
criminal cases?  And if they diverge, can prosecutors effectively manage their 
investigations when key investigatory tactics are lawful for police but forbidden for 
prosecutors? 
In the parallel context of undercover investigations, in which prosecutors direct 
undercover agents to elicit incriminating statements from represented defendants, the 
courts have uniformly interpreted the no-contact rule to allow for undercover 
contacts prior to the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings and the attachment of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  But no court, commentator, or committee 
has ever announced or proposed such a rule for overt contacts.  Before Montejo and 
Shatzer, there was no need to consider the question because the Miranda rules4 
tracked the ethical rules by way of Michigan v. Jackson.5  But things have now 
changed.  Jackson has been overruled, and Montejo and Shatzer force us to 
reconsider the standard analyses of the constitutional and ethical norms governing 
the following four scenarios, as applied to police and to prosecutors: 
 
1) In systems—paradigmatically, federal court—in which counsel is 
appointed for defendants at their initial appearance, but the Sixth 
Amendment does not attach until an indictment or information is filed 
(up to thirty days later), may law enforcement custodially contact the 
defendant, post-appointment but pre-attachment, without counsel 
present, in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, so long as the defendant 
has not invoked a right to counsel in a Miranda setting?  
 
And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing? 
 
2) May law enforcement custodially contact a represented criminal 
defendant post-attachment, where the defendant has been appointed 
counsel at an initial appearance but has not invoked his right to counsel 
in a Miranda setting? 
                                                          
 
1
 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009). 
 
2
 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222 (2010). 
 
3
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (enacted more or less verbatim in 
every state code). 
 
4
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966). 
 
5
 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 
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And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing? 
 
3) May law enforcement custodially contact a defendant, pre-attachment, 
in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, where the defendant has invoked 
his right to counsel in a Miranda setting but has then been released from 
custody for two weeks?     
 
And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing? 
 
4) May law enforcement custodially contact a defendant, post-attachment, 
in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, where the defendant has invoked 
his right to counsel in a Miranda setting but has then been released from 
custody for two weeks?  
 
And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing? 
  
In this paper, I examine the consequences of the divergence of ethical and 
constitutional rules, with particular attention to the institutional dynamics of criminal 
investigation and specifically the relationship between police and prosecutors.  This 
relationship is of crucial importance because Montejo and Shatzer create a legal 
regime in which non-lawyer agents and officers may initiate investigative contact 
with represented defendants in circumstances in which prosecutors are absolutely 
forbidden to do so.  This situation undermines the ability of prosecutors to 
effectively supervise the investigation of their cases and puts them in an untenable 
position when advising agents on the law.      
In Part II of this paper, I set out the facts and holdings of the new cases.  In Part 
III, I explain the scope and limits of the no-contact ethics rule as applied to criminal 
investigations.  In Part IV, I apply the constitutional and ethical rules to four specific 
investigatory scenarios to show how the legal limits on police and prosecutorial 
investigations diverge.  In Part V, I examine the potential consequences of divergent 
rules for police and prosecutors on permissible investigative methods.  In Part VI, I 
consider the likely practical consequences of the new cases for defendants.  I 
conclude that rather than lower the ethical bar for prosecutors, prosecuting agencies 
should raise the bar for their agents: Prosecutors should instruct their agents not to 
make Montejo/Shatzer contacts with defendants and should commit to a policy of 
not using any Montejo/Shatzer statements nonetheless obtained by law enforcement.  
Such a policy—already endorsed by the Justice Department for federal agents6—is, I 
think, necessary to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process, which is 
necessary for maintaining the social legitimacy of law enforcement.  
                                                          
 
6
 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Michigan v. 
Jackson at 11-12, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 
1019983 (stating that federal agents are unlikely to engage in Montejo contacts even if the 
Court allows them).  Of course, that’s just the Solicitor General’s prediction.  How the 
agencies’ internal guidelines develop is a different matter—as are the informal practice norms 
that may develop. 
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II.  THE NEW CASES 
A.  Montejo 
Jesse Montejo shot and killed Jerry Ferrari.7  Louisiana police investigating the 
murder arrested Montejo and read him his Miranda rights.8  Montejo waived his 
rights and agreed to answer questions.9  He admitted shooting Ferrari and said he had 
thrown the gun into a lake.10  Two days later he was brought to court for his initial 
appearance.11  The court appointed counsel for Montejo, who was then returned to 
jail.12  Before Montejo had met the lawyer who had been appointed for him, two 
detectives came to his cell and asked if he would be willing to show them where the 
murder weapon was.13  The detectives again read Montejo his Miranda rights, which 
he again waived.  He agreed to go with the detectives to find the gun.14  “During the 
excursion, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow.”15  The 
government introduced the letter at trial, over the objection that it had been obtained 
through a Miranda waiver obtained without counsel, after counsel had been 
appointed.16 
The Louisiana courts held that because Montejo had never expressly invoked his 
right to counsel, the post-appointment waiver was valid and the letter was 
admissible.17  The court distinguished Michigan v. Jackson, which had held that 
post-appointment waivers were presumed invalid where the defendant had requested 
counsel at an initial court appearance.18  Under Louisiana procedure, the court 
reasoned, the defendant never requests anything; counsel is automatically 
appointed.19  Therefore there was no invocation, and no Edwards bar on police re-
initiation of contact.20  
Montejo argued in the Supreme Court that the Jackson presumption of invalidity 
should be triggered by the fact that he had a lawyer, not by whether he had explicitly 
requested one.21  It would be irrational, he urged, to draw such an important 
                                                          
 
7
 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. 
 
8
 Id.  
 
9
 Id.  
 
10
 Id.  
 
11
 Id.  
 
12
 Id.  
 
13
 Id.  
 
14
 Id.  
 
15
 Id.  
 
16
 Id. at 2083.  
 
17
 Id. 
 
18
 Id.  
 
19
 Id.  
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 Id. at 2084. 
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constitutional distinction on the basis of the minutiae of state appointment hearing 
colloquies.22  Whether the hearing judge said, “Now Mr. Defendant, do you want a 
lawyer?” (as the colloquy runs in Michigan), or “Now Mr. Defendant, I’m 
appointing a lawyer to represent you” (as the colloquy runs in Louisiana), the 
relevant fact, he argued, is surely that, as of that moment, the defendant has a 
lawyer.23  The protection of Jackson—the presumptive invalidity of post-
appointment waivers—should not vary state to state based on the seemingly 
irrelevant turn of phrase employed by courts; surely the relevant fact is the 
appointment itself.24 
The Supreme Court agreed with Montejo that it would be irrational to apply 
Jackson based on the grammatical nuance of the state appointment procedures.25  Its 
solution, however, was not to reverse his conviction, but rather to overrule Jackson 
and throw out the entire concept of a presumption of invalidity for post-appointment 
waivers.26   
The Court’s reasoning was simple: Miranda rights can be waived, and the 
government may continue to seek a waiver until the suspect actually invokes his 
rights.27  
When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in the absence of 
any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any 
subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary.  There is no 
“initial election” to exercise the right . . . that must be preserved through a 
prophylactic rule against later waivers.  No reason exists to assume that a 
defendant like Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his 
intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be 
perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel 
present.  And no reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.28 
Additionally, the initial appearance cannot count as a Miranda right-to-counsel 
invocation, the Court held, because a right-to-counsel invocation can only be made 
“when the defendant is approached for interrogation.”29  Miranda rights, said the 
Court, cannot be invoked “anticipatorily.”30  Therefore the Edwards presumption of 
invalidity for post-invocation waivers should not be extended to post-appointment 
                                                          
 
22
 Id.  
 
23
 Id. at 2085. 
 
24
 Id.  
 
25
 Id.  
 
26
 Id. at 2091. 
 
27
 Invocation of the right to silence requires the police to stop questioning, wait for a 
decent interval, then re-Mirandize when they re-start questioning.  See Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).  Invocation of the right to counsel required (at the time Montejo was 
decided—things are different now, after Shatzer!) the police to stop questioning entirely until 
the defendant’s counsel was present.  See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
 
28
 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2087. 
 
29
 Id. at 2091. 
 
30
 Id.  
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waivers, because nothing that happens at the appointment hearing should be 
interpreted as an invocation of the right to have counsel present during questioning. 
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights 
anticipatorily, in a context other than “custodial interrogation.” . . .  What 
matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is 
approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during 
the interrogation—not what happened at any preliminary hearing.31 
In sum, until a suspect has invoked his right to counsel to a law-enforcement 
officer in response to a request for a Miranda waiver, law-enforcement officers may 
initiate contact to secure the suspect’s cooperation. 
B.  Shatzer 
Michael Shatzer was in prison for sexual assault.32  While he was serving his 
sentence, detectives received information about another crime he was alleged to have 
committed.33  They went to the prison, brought Shatzer to an interview room, and 
read him his Miranda rights.34  He invoked his right to counsel, and the detectives 
ended the interview and left.35  Ending the interview was the correct action under the 
Edwards rule, which provides that a suspect’s invocation of the Miranda right to 
counsel requires termination of questioning until counsel is present.36  Under 
Edwards, unless the suspect re-initiates the interview, any subsequent Miranda 
waiver will be presumed invalid.37  
Shatzer was not charged with the second offense, so a lawyer was not appointed 
for him.38  More than two years later, while Shatzer was still in prison on the original 
offense, the detectives received more information about the alleged second crime.39  
They returned to the prison, brought Shatzer to an interview room, and read him his 
Miranda rights.40  This time Shatzer waived his rights and made an incriminating 
statement.41  He was charged with the second crime, and the statement was admitted 
against him, over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of the Edwards 
                                                          
 
31
 Id.  
 
32
 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010). 
 
33
 Id.  
 
34
 Id.  
 
35
 Id.  
 
36
 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
 
37
 Id.  
 
38
 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218. 
 
39
 Id.  
 
40
 Id.  
 
41
 Id.  
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rule.42  The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed under Edwards, and the State 
appealed.43 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding for the first time that the 
Edwards presumption of invalidity for a post-invocation waiver of the right to 
counsel has a time limit of two weeks, if the suspect has been out of custody.44   
When . . . a suspect [who has invoked his right to counsel] has been 
released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for 
some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to 
think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has 
been coerced.  He has no longer been isolated.  He has likely been able to 
seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends.45  
The Court’s reasoning is thus that the initial presumption of coercion engendered 
by the experience of custodial interrogation can dissipate over time, and when it has 
dissipated, the rationale for the prophylactic Edwards rule no longer applies. 
The Court’s explanation for why two weeks is sufficient is less clear.  While the 
Shatzer case itself involved a two-year interval, the Court chose not to decide the 
case on its facts.  Instead, it held that two weeks is “plenty of time.”46  The Court 
invoked the common criminal procedure theme that law enforcement officers need 
clear rules to follow and asserted that it would be “impractical” to leave the precise 
duration of the Edwards limitations period to case-by-case litigation.47  So the Court 
had to pick a number, and two weeks was the winner.48  It is impractical to leave the 
                                                          
 
42
 Id.  
 
43
 Id.  
 
44
 Id. at 1223.  The Court also held, interestingly though not relevant to this Article, that 
Shatzer was constructively “out of custody” during the intervening two years, because he was 
returned to the general prison population, and was in prison on another conviction.  Thus, 
while he was confined, he was not in custody based on the alleged second offense.  Id. at 
1216. 
 
45
 Id. at 1221. 
 
46
 Id. at 1223. 
 
47
 Id. at 1222. 
 
48
 Professor Kerr commented wryly at the time:  
As a matter of policy, I think that’s a pretty good rule.  But why precisely 14 days? 
That is, 336 hours, or exactly 20,160 minutes?  There is no 14-day Clause in the 
Constitution.  (I checked.)  Why not 15 days?  Or 13.491 days?  As far as I can guess, 
the only reason 14 days was chosen is that it’s easy to remember and seemed in the 
right ballpark.  Jews started measuring seven days as a time period in the 6th Century 
BC; the Romans then adopted it, measuring time in 7-day weeks; and two-thousand-
odd years later, on February 24, 2010, a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court 
thought that one of those was too short, three was too long, and two seemed about 
right.  And how did the Justices know that 14 days would be about right?  Based on 
their extensive experience being arrested, perhaps?  Presumably not.  But no matter.  
Fourteen days seemed about right, and so the 14-day rule became the law. 
Orin Kerr, Does the Constitution Have a 14-Day Clause?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2010, 
11:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/does-the-constitution-have-a-14-day-clause/. 
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answer to that question for clarification in future case-by-case adjudication; law 
enforcement officers need to know, with certainty and beforehand, when renewed 
interrogation is lawful.49  “It seems to us that period is 14 days.  That provides plenty 
of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends 
and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.”50 
Shatzer thus complements Montejo.  While Montejo applies to represented 
defendants who have not invoked their right to counsel when asked to waive it, 
Shatzer applies to those who have invoked it, and its holding is easily summarized:  
When can you re-approach?  If you let the guy go free51 and wait two weeks, then re-
arrest him. 
C.  Restatement of the New Rule 
Here, in sum, is the jurisprudential significance of these cases: Montejo wipes out 
Jackson and pushes the analysis to Edwards.  Then Shatzer announces a two-week 
limit on Edwards.  This is a big change. 
Montejo holds that the Sixth Amendment can be validly waived, post-attachment, 
by a represented defendant, without the knowledge of the defendant’s lawyer.52  
Montejo emphatically rejects the claim that the fact of representation is relevant to 
the validity of the waiver.  Montejo overrules Jackson and holds that Edwards 
provides sufficient protection for defendants invoking the right to counsel.53  
Edwards, not the fact of attachment or of representation, is the source of any 
prohibition on contact.  
Shatzer then dramatically limits Edwards, holding that the post-invocation 
prohibition on government-initiated contact lasts only two weeks.54  So combining 
the two holdings, we reach the following restatement: (1) the fact of representation is 
irrelevant to the validity of an uncounseled waiver; (2) the fact of Sixth Amendment 
attachment is irrelevant to the validity of an uncounseled waiver; (3) Edwards 
supplies the limits on government waiver requests; and (4) Edwards is now limited 
to two weeks, so the government can renew an uncounseled custodial waiver request 
post-invocation after a two-week period of release from custody.     
In short, after two weeks of freedom, a Shatzer defendant is identically situated 
to a Montejo defendant.  Under Montejo, the government may initiate uncounseled, 
custodial, post-attachment contact with a represented defendant to seek a waiver, 
unless there’s an Edwards bar.  And under Shatzer, the Edwards bar lapses after two 
weeks.  Thus, after two weeks of freedom, a post-attachment defendant who has 
invoked and acquired counsel can be re-arrested,55 and then re-approached by the 
government in an attempt to secure a waiver. 
                                                          
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 The case may also be a release back to the general population. 
 
52
 See supra Part II.A. 
 
53
 Id. 
 
54
 See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 
55
 This is assuming probable cause, obviously.  But that’s no big hurdle after Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (pretextual arrest permissible if based on probable cause) 
and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (arrest for minor traffic violation 
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So does this mean that even when a defendant invokes his right to counsel, if 
there is a long period between charge and trial, and the defendant is out on bail, the 
government can re-arrest him every two weeks, and then, without his lawyer, ask if 
he wants to talk?  Yes, it does, as a constitutional matter.  The more difficult 
question is whether the prosecutor, as an ethical matter, can participate. 
III.  THE NO-CONTACT RULE 
A.  Background 
The no-contact rule has been part of every formal code of legal ethics since the 
nineteenth century.56  It provides that a lawyer cannot knowingly communicate about 
a matter with a person who the lawyer knows (or should know) is represented in that 
matter by another lawyer.57  It is found, in almost verbatim language, in every state 
ethics code, which apply to federal as well as state prosecutors; by statute, federal 
prosecutors are covered by the state rules in any district where they practice.58   
There is, however, one major exception: Contacts are permitted if they are 
“authorized by law.”59  Among the contacts uniformly held to be authorized by law 
are undercover investigatory contacts initiated by prosecutors where the target has 
not yet been indicted.60  In this respect, the ethics rule exception tracks the limits of 
the Sixth Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment prohibits the deliberate elicitation of 
incriminating statements from criminal defendants after the right to counsel has 
attached, which is at either indictment (in federal prosecutions) or some earlier point 
                                                          
permissible under Fourth Amendment).  One would imagine it going down like this: You get 
the guy on one charge; he invokes and makes bail.  So you wait two weeks, follow him until 
he violates a traffic law, then arrest him, get him back in the interrogation room, and try again.  
Can you do that?  Shatzer says yes, you can.  See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.  Of course, if he 
invokes again, you have to stop.  There’s still no badgering allowed.  See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2090.  But if you’re polite, you can repeat the scenario every two weeks.  Pretext is 
permissible.  If the guy runs a stop sign, you can bring him in. 
 
56
 See generally John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer’s Client: The 
Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 684 (1979) (tracing the rule 
to an 1836 treatise).  
 
57
 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009). 
 
58
 The McDade Amendment, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006), subjects federal 
attorneys to the ethics rules of the state where they practice.  For pre-McDade Amendment 
regulations, see Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (Aug. 4, 
1994) (providing DOJ regulation exempting Department attorneys from state and federal court 
rules prohibiting contacts with represented persons) (replaced by Ethical Standards for 
Attorneys for the Government, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,273 (Apr. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 77)). 
 
59
 For example, Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules provides:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in 
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do 
so by law or a court order. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009). 
 
60
 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). 
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(in most state prosecutions) that marks the beginning of “formal adversarial 
proceedings.”61  Under Massiah v. United States,62 pre-attachment undercover 
investigations, including those directed by prosecutors, are permissible, and the 
ethics rules track that holding.63  Thus there is neither a constitutional nor an ethical 
reason why prosecutors should not direct and supervise agents in making undercover 
contact with represented criminal suspects, so long as the suspects have not been 
indicted. 
Because the Sixth Amendment protection for defendants begins at indictment (or 
the equivalent state procedure), pre-indictment, overt contact by law enforcement is 
constitutionally permissible.64  Several courts have held that the no-contact 
prohibition “entifies” (comes into being) at the moment the Sixth Amendment 
attaches.65  No attachment, no ethical prohibition.  Other courts have held that the 
no-contact rule attaches at the time of representation and thus is in force pre-
attachment.66  In either event, though, certain contacts might still be “authorized by 
law.”  Thus, for example, the Third Circuit held pre-attachment, undercover contacts 
to be “authorized by law” even under the Pennsylvania rule, which does apply pre-
attachment.67    
In jurisdictions where the no-contact obligation only entifies at attachment, 
prosecutors are placed in an ethical position different from all other attorneys: They 
are permitted to contact represented defendants because (as a legal fiction) there is as 
                                                          
 
61
 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
 
62
 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 
63
 See, e.g., United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The duty to avoid ex 
parte contacts does not apply to pre-indictment, noncustodial conversations with a suspect.”); 
State v. Lang, 702 A.2d 135 (Vt. 1997) (“[T]he rule has an exception for communications 
authorized by law, and we believe it applies to these undercover operations.”). 
 
64
 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
 
65
 See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The prosecutor’s 
ethical duty to refrain from contacting represented defendants entifies upon indictment for the 
same reasons that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.”); United States v. Balter, 
91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996) (construing New Jersey’s ethics rules and holding that “[b]y 
its terms, Rule 4.2 applies to a ‘party’ represented in a ‘matter.’ . . .  [A] criminal suspect is 
not a ‘party’ until ‘after formal legal or adversarial proceedings are commenced.’ . . .  
Moreover, even if a criminal suspect were a ‘party’ within the meaning of the Rule, pre-
indictment investigation by prosecutors is precisely the type of contact exempted from the 
Rule as ‘authorized by law.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 
66
 For example, Minnesota courts interpret the rule to apply pre-attachment.  See State v. 
Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 467 (Minn. 1999). 
[B]ecause the interests protected by MRPC 4.2 and the constitutional protections 
relating to an individual’s right to counsel are fundamentally different, there is no 
rational basis to conclude that the application of the protection afforded should 
necessarily be coextensive.  Thus we do not perceive that the application of MRPC 4.2 
should be limited, in a criminal context, to contacts with an attorney’s client after the 
client has been charged. 
Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 467. 
 
67
 See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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yet no “matter”; the “matter,” under these cases, is the formal charge, not the 
investigation.  This distinction is unique to the criminal context: In no other litigation 
context does the obligation not to contact a represented party depend on whether 
there are formal judicial proceedings underway.  Commentators and defense 
attorneys have complained about this, of course.  One defense attorney wrote: 
This disparate treatment of “parties” not yet indicted or charged in 
criminal cases is unfair, undermines the policy behind [Rule] 4.2 and 
demonstrates a cynical view of defense counsel’s role in the criminal 
justice system. . . .  [T]he government’s legitimate right to investigate 
suspected crimes should not trump [Rule] 4.2’s policy of protecting 
parties from overzealous lawyers, preserving the integrity of the attorney-
client relationship, preventing the inadvertent disclosure of privileged 
information and facilitating settlement.  All lawyers owe the same duties 
under the ethical rules no matter whom they represent or how legitimate 
their litigation goals.68 
He points out that in civil litigation, the pre-filing period, when most settlements are 
worked out, is obviously and necessarily subject to the rule.69  Why then, he asks, not 
also in criminal cases, in which pre-attachment settlements (depending, of course, on 
the jurisdiction’s attachment rules) are also the norm?  The case law, however, is 
generally to the contrary: Criminal investigations are different.70  
B.  What Does “Authorized by Law” Mean?  
The no-contact rule forbids contacts with represented defendants, but expressly 
allows contacts that are “authorized by law.”71  There is no dispute that 
Montejo/Shatzer contacts are directed at represented persons, nor that the contacts 
concern the subject matter of the representation.  Thus, the only question is whether 
they should be considered “authorized by law.”  The rule does not create those 
authorizations; it incorporates those created by other sources of law.  The Model 
Rules commentary, for example, states that contacts authorized by law “include 
constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing 
                                                          
 
68
 Lawrence Palles, Submitted Prosecutors Should Be Forbidden from Contacting Parties 
Ex Parte When Those Parties Are Represented by Counsel and Not Charged with Criminal 
Offenses, ARIZ. ATT’Y, June 2005, at 41, 42. 
 
69
 Id. at 46. 
 
70
 Although, in what looks like an outlier with somewhat unusual facts, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held in Miller that the no-contact rule was violated when government 
attorneys who had been involved in a civil investigation of a corporation and its management, 
in which they had communicated only through the defendant’s counsel, then opened a 
criminal investigation and immediately interviewed defendants without counsel present.  
Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 468.  
[T]he question is whether there is a rational basis to conclude that a change in the 
nature of the investigation from civil to criminal justifies allowing the prosecutor’s 
contact with appellant as “authorized by law,” when contact was clearly prohibited by 
MRPC 4.2 when the proceeding was civil in nature.  We believe there is none. 
Id. 
 
71
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009). 
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governmental entities.”72  So it is at least facially plausible that a Supreme Court 
opinion stating explicitly that the Constitution is not violated by certain overt 
government contacts with a represented defendant should make said contacts 
“authorized by law” for purposes of applying the rule. 
For example, the California no-contact provision, Rule 2-100, provides that the 
rule “shall not prohibit . . . [c]ommunications otherwise authorized by law” and then 
explains that the rule is binding “unless a statutory scheme or case law will override 
the rule.”73  The comment gives examples of relevant statutory schemes, and then 
states: “Other applicable law also includes the authority of government prosecutors 
and investigators to conduct criminal investigations, as limited by the relevant 
decisional law.”74  
So does the “relevant decisional law” governing “the authority of government 
prosecutors and investigators to conduct criminal investigations” include Sixth 
Amendment cases like Montejo and Shatzer?  The Ninth Circuit says no.  It has 
interpreted the California rule as referring only to explicit authorization for 
government attorneys to contact represented defendants. 
The “authorized by law” exception to Rule 2-100 requires that a statutory 
scheme expressly permit contact between an attorney and a represented 
party. . . .  Nothing in these [statutory] provisions [cited by the 
government] expressly or impliedly authorizes contact with represented 
individuals beyond that permitted by case law.  [Therefore], “the authority 
of government prosecutors and investigators to conduct criminal 
investigations” is “limited by the relevant decisional law” to contacts 
conducted prior to indictment in a non-custodial setting.75  
Furthermore, the commentary also states that the “authorized by law” exception 
applies “when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity 
permissible under this Rule or has found the Rule inapplicable.  However, the Rule 
imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional 
provisions.”76 
A change in a constitutional rule will not necessarily translate into a change in 
the ethical rule and will not serve as a defense against ethics charges.  This is 
because the ethical rule has a very different doctrinal basis from the constitutional 
rules of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: While those provisions give rights to 
defendants, the no-contact rule gives a right to attorneys.  As the Second Circuit put 
it in Hamad, another no-contact case: “The sixth amendment [sic] and the 
disciplinary rule serve separate, albeit congruent purposes.”77  And the Supreme 
Court of Michigan explained: “The provisions of the code are not constitutional or 
                                                          
 
72
 Id. cmt. 2. 
 
73
 CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-100 discussion (1992). 
 
74
 Id.  
 
75
 United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
76
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (2009). 
 
77
 United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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statutory rights guaranteed to individual persons.  They are instead self-imposed 
internal regulations prescribing the standards of conduct for members of the bar.”78 
The no-contact prohibition is waivable only by the attorney, not by the client.  
Accordingly, Fifth and Sixth Amendment case law addressing the validity of 
defendants’ waivers of their rights is unlikely to translate into exceptions to the no-
contact rule.  As the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct explain: “The fact that 
a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient 
to establish that the communication is permissible under this rule.”79 
In short, the argument for reading a Montejo/Shatzer exception into the no-
contact rule’s “authorized by law” provision is untenable.  Of course, some states 
might decide to adopt one.  But as the codes now stand, the exception is not 
available.  My research assistants and I surveyed the no-contact rule case law for all 
fifty states in an attempt to predict whether Montejo/Shatzer contacts would be held 
to be ethics violations.  We found, as expected, that almost all the states have case 
law stating expressly that the no-contact rule cannot be waived by the client; this 
nearly-uniform interpretation rules out the possibility of a Montejo/Shatzer exception 
under existing law, because Montejo and Shatzer are waiver cases.  There is not a 
shred of authority in any state supporting the proposition that a client waiver can 
render over uncounseled contact “authorized by law.”80  
C.  Undercover Investigations 
The only other context in which constitutional criminal procedure case law has 
been imported into the no-contact rule is undercover investigations.  In that context, 
courts were faced with the Massiah rule, which holds that pre-attachment, deliberate 
elicitation by undercover agents of incriminating statements from represented 
defendants is permissible under the Sixth Amendment.81  Despite the fact that 
constitutionally permitted contacts are not necessarily also ethically permitted, 
however, courts have uniformly interpreted the no-contact rule to track the 
constitutional rule established by Massiah,82 so that any undercover contact 
constitutionally permitted by Massiah is also ethically permissible.   
                                                          
 
78
 State v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979).  
 
79
 VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2009).  
 
80
 See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lopez, 4 
F.3d at 1462 (holding that a criminal defendant did not have a right not to be contacted and 
consequently could not waive application of section 2-100). 
 
81
 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). 
 
82
 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that pre-
indictment use of undercovers to elicit incriminating statements is permissible under 
applicable state ethics rules); United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (holding the same as a general matter, but egregious prosecutorial misconduct can 
be a violation); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D. Md. 1994). 
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Indeed, in the Hammad decision from the Second Circuit, which is one of the 
few instances in which a federal court has found a no-contact violation, the court 
took care to emphasize that the prosecutor’s conduct—creating a “sham” grand jury 
subpoena to trick the target—went beyond the mine-run of undercover 
investigations.83  In most cases, the court stated, “the use of informants by 
government prosecutors in a pre-indictment, non-custodial situation, absent the type 
of misconduct that occurred in this case, will generally fall within the ‘authorized by 
law’ exception.”84   
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that the no-contact rule does not apply at 
all prior to attachment, explaining that “[t]he prosecutor’s ethical duty to refrain 
from contacting represented defendants entifies upon indictment for the same 
reasons that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.”85  Thus, prosecutors 
may authorize undercover contacts with represented defendants up until the initiation 
of formal adversarial proceedings, when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches.  It is irrelevant that the defendant has a lawyer, has been charged by 
complaint, and knows an indictment is coming.   
One might well ask why the ethical obligation should entify only upon 
indictment—after all, many pre-indictment suspects know that they are under 
investigation—some defendants may know that an indictment is forthcoming; others 
know that they are targets and retain counsel precisely to help them avoid 
indictment.86  This is standard operating procedure in white-collar cases, where an 
indictment can functionally be a “death sentence.”87  It is also standard operating 
procedure in districts with “fast-track” programs, which offer substantial discounts 
for pre-indictment pleas.  And it is of necessity standard operating procedure in 
every federal case in which the defendant is arrested on a complaint, because the 
rules of criminal procedure provide for appointment of counsel at the initial 
appearance.88  Thus, there is in most federal criminal cases a window of two weeks 
                                                          
 
83
 Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.  
 
84
 Id.  The only other circuit court decision I am aware of in which the court upheld a 
finding of an ethical violation also concerned unusual conduct that converted otherwise 
permissible contact into a violation.  See Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455.  The prosecutor in Lopez had 
sought and obtained a court order to communicate with a represented defendant, who had 
contacted the prosecutor because he did not trust his attorney.  Id. at 1457.  The district court 
found, however, that the prosecutor had misled the magistrate judge who issued the order, and 
the Ninth Circuit accepted that finding, holding that “judicial approval cannot absolve the 
government from responsibility for wrongful acts when the government has misled the court 
in obtaining its sanction.”  Id. at 1461. 
 
85
 Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1460. 
 
86
 This is, after all, the primary function of expensive white-collar defense lawyers. 
 
87
 Particularly, this is the case if the defendant is a corporation.  See, e.g., Christopher 
Wray & Robert Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thomson 
Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006) (“Because indictment 
often amounts to a virtual death sentence for business entities, a corporate prosecution 
provides the government an ‘opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.’” (quoting 
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components 
and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm)). 
 
88
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a). 
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or more in which the defendant is represented but the Sixth Amendment has not 
attached.  Does Lopez allow for prosecutors to contact defendants in that period 
without the presence or consent of counsel?  It appears to.89   
Of course, prosecutors never have.  I prosecuted hundreds of reactive cases and 
never would have dreamed of directly contacting a pre-attachment defendant who 
had been appointed counsel.  Aside from internal department regulations, there was a 
constitutional reason: Jackson.  Before Montejo, neither police nor prosecutors 
would have contemplated making direct contact with a represented defendant even in 
a pre-indictment in a fast-track case because it was barred by Jackson.90  But now 
that the constitutional bar imposed by Jackson has been wiped away, is there any 
ethical bar, in states where the ethical obligation doesn’t entify until indictment?  
The answer, I think, is likely no. 
The courts holding that pre-indictment, undercover contacts are permissible 
justified their holdings with reference to the purposes of the ethics rules and the 
balancing of social harms and benefits of criminal investigation.  For example, in 
United States v. Balter,91 the Third Circuit held that a federal prosecutor did not 
violate New Jersey’s no-contact rule92 when he used a confidential informant to 
contact a represented person in the course of a pre-indictment investigation.  The 
court held both that “the rule d[oes] not apply to a criminal suspect prior to the 
commencement of adversarial proceedings against the suspect,” and also that even if 
it did apply, “pre-indictment investigation by prosecutors is precisely the type of 
contact exempted from the Rule as ‘authorized by law.’”93  The court explained its 
holding on policy grounds.  “Prohibiting prosecutors from investigating an 
unindicted suspect who has retained counsel would serve only to insulate certain 
classes of suspects from ordinary pre-indictment investigation.  Furthermore, such a 
rule would significantly hamper legitimate law enforcement operations by making it 
very difficult to investigate certain individuals.”94 
The Third Circuit recently reiterated its Balter holdings in United States v. 
Brown.  “The question before us then is whether AUSA Daniel was ‘authorized by 
law’ to use a confidential informant to communicate with a represented suspect in 
the course of a pre-indictment investigation.”95  The court held that the “well-
established investigative technique” employed by the prosecutor—sending an 
undercover informant to contact the defendant with instructions on what to say—was 
within the “authorized by law exception” and thus did not violate the rule.96  This 
                                                          
 
89
 It bears emphasis that the contact in Lopez was direct, not undercover.  Lopez, 4 F.3d at 
1457. 
 
90
 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 
91
 United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
92
 The rule was identical to ABA Model Rule 4.2: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall 
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless authorized by law to do so.”  Balter, 91 
F.3d at 435 (quoting N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2004)). 
 
93
 Balter, 91 F.3d at 436. 
 
94
 Id. 
 
95
 United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
96
 Id. at 516. 
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was so, the court held, even though the Pennsylvania no-contact rule applies before 
adversarial proceedings have begun, because such contacts are within the 
“authorized by law” exception, even if other kinds of pre-indictment contact might 
violate the rule.  “[W]e do not believe the McDade Amendment prohibits federal 
prosecutors in Pennsylvania from using a well-established investigatory technique 
simply because the Pennsylvania courts have not considered whether such conduct is 
permissible.”97  
Is it perhaps significant, then, that the targets of pre-indictment undercover 
investigations are virtually never in custody?98  One rationale for the exception is 
that undercover investigation is simply so vital to law-enforcement that absent 
explicit legislative action courts should not assume it to be barred.99  Indeed, most 
states’ ethics commentary follows the ABA Model Rules and specifically identifies 
“pre-indictment, non-custodial” contacts as among those authorized.  If the contact is 
pre-indictment and non-custodial, should it matter whether it’s undercover or overt?  
Some courts have held that so long as the contact is pre-attachment, it is per se 
permissible whether overt or covert.  As one district court commented in approving 
overt contact under the rule:  
Although these cases usually involve undercover contacts, most of the 
decisions approve pre-indictment contacts in categorical terms.  Research 
shows that no court has ever suppressed evidence in a criminal case 
because a prosecutor violated Rule 4.2 in the course of an investigation 
before the grand jury indicted the defendant.100 
Although the contacted defendant in Binder was not in custody, such dicta 
(“most of the decisions approve pre-indictment contacts in categorical terms”)101 at 
least allows for a plausible argument that any pre-attachment contact is permissible.  
As to post-attachment contact, it is highly unlikely that any court would allow it 
under the ethics rules, because the “authorized by law” exception for undercover 
contacts has never been applied post-attachment.  Let us now turn, then, to the four 
scenarios described at the outset to see whether meaningful guidance for law 
enforcement and defendants can be gleaned from the new holdings. 
                                                          
 
97
 Id. 
 
98
 See, e.g., United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1983) (no ethical violation 
because subject not in custody).  
 
99
 The same reasoning explains why the ethical rule, 8.4 in the ABA Model Rules, 
forbidding lawyers from engaging in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” has 
never been held applicable to undercover work in criminal cases.  Every court to consider the 
matter has simply stated that there is a law-enforcement exception that applies to prosecutors.  
As one recent commentator points out, a general public-policy rationale would also seem to 
support exceptions for some private attorneys too, such as for civil rights investigations.  See 
Barry Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based vs. Status-Based 
Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008).    
 
100
 United States v. Binder, 167 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (E.D.N.C. 2001).  
 
101
 Id. 
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IV.  FOUR SCENARIOS: MONTEJO AND SHATZER, PRE- AND POST-ATTACHMENT 
A.  Pre-Attachment Montejo Contacts 
1.  Police 
May police initiate contact, pre-attachment, with a represented defendant who 
has been appointed counsel but has not yet invoked in a Miranda setting?  Yes.  
Jackson’s prophylactic rule barred police-initiated questioning after the appointment 
of counsel and held any waivers thus obtained invalid as a matter of law.  Jackson is 
now overruled, and the new rule is clear: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda 
rights during an attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact 
and seek a waiver.102  
2.  Prosecutor 
In any state with case law holding that the ethical obligation “entifies” upon 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment, there is no ethical bar to the prosecutor 
participating.  In such a state, the prosecutor is in the same position as the police: 
The only reason not to make such contacts was Jackson, and Jackson is overruled.  
Thus, for prosecutors in such jurisdictions—for example, in California—the same 
rule applies: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an attempted 
custodial interrogation, the prosecutor may initiate contact and seek a waiver, as 
well as direct the police to do so.103  
Of course, the situation is different in states, such as Pennsylvania and 
Minnesota, where the no-contact rule has been interpreted to apply to pre-attachment 
contact.  But even in such states, prosecutors may have a colorable argument for 
permissibility, depending on the specific test the courts use to evaluate alleged 
violations.  Conduct may be covered by, but permissible under, the rule.  In 
Minnesota, for instance, the rule is applied on a case-by-case basis to pre-attachment 
as well as post-attachment contact.  The test, in either scenario, is whether the 
prosecutor has gone beyond “appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory 
activity of police.”104 
Adverse counsel’s contacts with an attorney’s client can be disruptive and 
deleterious to the attorney’s relationship with a client irrespective of 
whether the client has been charged with a crime, and the need for an 
attorney’s counsel in an adverse interview is certainly no less before the 
client is charged than after.  We hold that the appropriate analysis is to 
look at alleged violations on a case-by-case basis, examining the totality 
of the circumstances of the contact to determine if it went beyond 
appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory activity of police to 
implicate issues relating to the fair administration of justice on the part of 
the prosecuting attorney.105 
                                                          
 
102
 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. 
 
103
 Id. 
 
104
 Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 467. 
 
105
 Id. 
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This test may make the ethics rule dependent on the constitutional rule to some 
extent, because the constitutional rule will, over time, set the boundaries of 
“appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory activity.”  Now that Montejo and 
Shatzer are the law, police contact with represented defendants in those scenarios 
could (and, one assumes, will) become “commonly accepted investigatory activity of 
police.”  The only reason police didn’t do post-appointment interviews with willing 
defendants without their counsel present was Jackson.  There is now, as the Supreme 
Court itself said expressly, no reason not to do it.106  Of course, some agencies, 
notably the federal DOJ, prohibit such contacts in their own internal rules, but one 
imagines not every police department will follow suit.  Thus, if the Minnesota no-
contact rule derives its scope from what police may legitimately do, and what they 
habitually do, there may be an argument before too long that Montejo and Shatzer 
have turned Miller on its head.   
To be sure, though, there is surely some distance between police conduct that is 
not unconstitutional, and police conduct that is “appropriate and commonly 
accepted.”107  And in jurisdictions without a clear holding, the custodial nature of the 
contact might tip the balance in a functional inquiry into whether a Montejo 
interview is “deleterious to the attorney’s relationship” with the client.108  I would 
think the Miller rationale would favor finding a violation: Certainly if Montejo’s 
lawyer had been present, he would have advised Montejo not to make the 
incriminating statements that ultimately were used at his trial.  
This is exactly what happened in United States v. Ward.109  The prosecutor, 
without defense counsel present, visited the suspect, who had not been indicted but 
knew he was a target and had retained defense counsel.110  The prosecutor told the 
suspect that the government’s case was strong, an indictment was coming, and 
suggested that the suspect should think about cooperating.111  Defense counsel 
moved for suppression based on the allegedly improper contact.  The government 
argued in district court that this contact was not improper because the no-contact rule 
did not apply pre-indictment.112  The court acknowledged the “impressive number of 
                                                          
 
106
 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086-87.  
No reason exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo, who has done 
nothing at all to express his intentions with respect to his Sixth 
Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the 
police without having counsel present.  And no reason exists to prohibit 
the police from inquiring. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
107
 One thinks, for example, of Lago Vista police officer Bart Turek, whose arrest of Gail 
Atwater for not wearing her seatbelt did not violate Atwater’s Fourth Amendment rights, but 
did cost Turek his job and a Supreme Court tongue-lashing.  See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 
U.S. 318 (2001).  
 
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1973) (pre-
indictment custodial interview “raised questions” under no-contact rule). 
 
109
 United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 
110
 Id. at 1003. 
 
111
 Id.  
 
112
 Id. at 1004. 
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opinions persuasively reasoning that [the no-contact rule] does not and should not 
apply to pre-indictment, non-custodial contacts.”113   
The court, however, did not endorse the government’s interpretation of the 
ethical rule.  Instead, it denied the defendant’s suppression motion because 
suppression would not be a proper remedy for an ethical violation in any event.114  
Thus it did not decide the ethical issue.  The court made it plain, however, that if it 
had been forced to decide the ethics issue, it would have found a violation: 
Given that the stated purpose of the meeting was to confront Ward with 
the allegedly overwhelming nature of the evidence against him and to 
discuss his cooperation options, the danger for Ward of uncounseled 
communication with the Government is readily apparent.  Couple this 
danger with the power of the prosecutor to control the timing of the 
indictment and the triggering of constitutional protections which would 
prohibit such contact and the potential for prejudice and abuse of power 
increases.  In contrast to the covert use of informants, the Court finds the 
balance of competing interests weighs in favor of prohibiting overt 
contacts with represented parties for the purposes of discussing 
cooperation with the Government.115 
What the court describes is, of course, every Montejo contact—with the added factor 
that the Montejo defendant, unlike Ward, will be in custody.  Without some very 
clear black-letter protection, it would be a reckless prosecutor who signed off on one 
of these interviews.  My advice to prosecuting authorities around the country: Don’t 
do these interviews, and don’t use them, until your legislature or courts give you 
very clear authority. 
B.  Post-Attachment Montejo Contacts 
1.  Police 
As to the police, the same rule applies to post-attachment Montejo contacts as to 
pre-attachment contacts: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an 
attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact and seek a waiver.  
It is irrelevant whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, because, 
per Montejo, the right can be waived; and it is irrelevant whether counsel is present, 
because, per Montejo, counsel’s presence is not necessary for a valid waiver.  Thus 
the same rule applies: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an 
attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact and seek a 
waiver.116  
2.  Prosecutors 
The no-contact rule is always applicable post-attachment, and prosecutors cannot 
make contact with a represented defendant except as “authorized by law.”  And it is 
doubtful, as explained above, that a court would treat Montejo as creating a new 
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 Id. at 1008. 
 
114
 Id. at 1007. 
 
115
 Id. at 1006. 
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 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. 
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“authorized by law” exception for three reasons: First, Montejo is a Sixth 
Amendment case, and the no-contact rule does not necessarily follow the Sixth 
Amendment; second, the Montejo Court itself assumes that Montejo contacts would 
be unethical for prosecutors; and third, Montejo is a waiver case, and the no-contact 
prohibition is not waiveable by clients.  
C.  Pre-Attachment Shatzer Contacts 
The paradigmatic pre-attachment Shatzer contact will occur in the following 
way: Assume a federal court proceeding, where the Sixth Amendment doesn’t attach 
until indictment.  DEA agents arrest a suspect for drug trafficking.  The government 
files a complaint charging, say, 21 U.S.C. § 841.  The suspect invokes his right to 
counsel; the interview is terminated per Edwards; the suspect appears in court and is 
appointed counsel; bail is set, and the suspect makes bail and is released.  Appointed 
defense counsel calls the prosecutor and they talk about possible terms of a plea 
agreement.  The prosecutor tells defense counsel that he can offer very good terms if 
the suspect will disclose his supplier.  Defense counsel consults with her client and 
tells the prosecutor that he’s not going to snitch.   
Now, two weeks later, the suspect has not yet been indicted on the federal 
charges (the government has thirty days to do so).  He has gone back to work, but 
unluckily sells drugs to a local police officer working undercover.  He is arrested.  
The local police run his sheet, see the pending federal charges, and call the DEA 
agents.  The agents arrive at the local jail, approach the suspect, re-Mirandize him, 
and ask him if he would like to change his mind and cooperate.  After all, they 
remind him, federal cooperation can make the state beef disappear too.117  This time, 
he says yes, and agrees to flip and incriminate his connections.  No one ever calls his 
lawyer.  
1.  Police 
As before, the question is a straightforward one for the police or agents: Yes, 
they may do this.118 
2.  Prosecutors 
For the prosecutor, it’s a closer call.  To be sure, this is a pre-indictment scenario, 
and in states such as California, the prosecutor may successfully rely on case law 
such as Lopez to assert the absolute inapplicability of Rule 4.2 prior to attachment.  
However, I would be cautious in any state where the case law even arguably left 
room for pre-attachment applicability.  If a state applied a functional test such as 
whether the contact undermined the purposes of the attorney-client relationship, I 
think a court could well see this as a violation.  After all, the client indisputably has 
an attorney on the matter, despite the legal fiction that there is no “matter” pre-
indictment: Here, the court has appointed the attorney to represent the defendant on 
the federal charge, and the attorney has already begun negotiations with the 
prosecutor on that charge.  And the defendant has already told the police, in the first 
interview, that he wants his attorney to serve as a buffer.  To be sure, after Shatzer, 
he can constitutionally change his mind, but that’s not the ethical question in a state 
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 As a matter of comity, self-interest, and overwork, state prosecutors are almost always 
willing to hand a case over to the feds. 
 
118
 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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like Minnesota.  The question, rather, is whether the contact served to undermine the 
attorney-client relationship on the federal charge.  And given that, by definition, a 
Shatzer scenario involves a relationship that is at least two weeks old, and has 
already been sought out and relied on by the defendant, it would seem that Shatzer 
contacts would be more readily seen as violating the rule than Montejo contacts on 
such a test. 
D.  Post-Attachment Shatzer Contacts 
1.  Police  
For the police, as with Montejo contacts, attachment is irrelevant.  The rule is the 
same: Give a guy two weeks of freedom, and you can re-initiate custodial 
interrogation in the attempt to get a waiver.  Obviously, a cycle of biweekly pretext 
arrests followed by a custodial re-initiation might lead to an inference of badgering 
in violation of Edwards119—but short of badgering, the contact is constitutional, and 
if you do get lucky and get your waiver, it will stand. 
2.  Prosecutors 
I cannot see any possibility of post-attachment Shatzer contacts being permitted 
under the ethics rules, for all the reasons given thus far.  Thus, as noted below, this is 
an area in which difficult cases are likely to arise.  I think it not unlikely that a 
defendant, out on bail post-indictment, with a lengthy pre-trial period, might be 
arrested (in good faith, presumably by another agency on other grounds) and the 
agents handling the first case might learn of the arrest and decide to re-approach.  As 
discussed below, I see no possibility of permissible prosecutorial involvement and a 
real danger of imputed involvement through ratification if the prosecutor uses a 
statement obtained in this way.   
E.  Discussion 
Both the time of attachment, and the relevance of attachment for the no-contact 
rule, vary from state to state.  In some jurisdictions, for example California and New 
Jersey, the no-contact rule only binds prosecutors once formal adversarial 
proceedings have begun and the Sixth Amendment has attached.120  In others, for 
example Pennsylvania and Minnesota, the rule applies before attachment as well. 
Thus, while Montejo itself involved post-attachment contact,121 in other 
jurisdictions (notably the federal system), the same facts would not give rise to 
attachment.  And the rule itself may or may not track attachment in any event.  For 
example, in New Jersey, prosecutors would not be barred from making post-
appointment, pre-indictment contact with a defendant, while across the river in 
Pennsylvania, they would.   
                                                          
 
119
 Both Montejo and Shatzer emphasize the Edwards anti-badgering rule.  See, e.g., 
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 
120
 See, e.g., New Jersey v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 589 A.2d 180, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1991). 
 
121
 State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260 (La. 2008) (“In this case, defendant’s right to 
counsel attached at the 72-hour hearing held on the morning of September 10, 2002, at which 
time indigent defense counsel was appointed to represent him.”), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2079. 
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There is no question, however, that the constitutionality of Montejo contacts 
extends past attachment.  The Montejo Court explicitly decided the case as a post-
attachment scenario: 
It is worth emphasizing first what is not in dispute or at stake here.  Under 
our precedents, once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel 
present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings.  Interrogation 
by the State is such a stage.  
. . . .    
In practice, Montejo’s rule would prevent police-initiated 
interrogation entirely once the Sixth Amendment right attaches . . . .  That 
would have constituted a “shockingly dramatic restructuring of the 
balance this Court has traditionally struck between the rights of the 
defendant and those of the larger society.”122 
It is important to note, however, that while in many states a similar attachment 
rule (viz.: attachment at early stages of proceedings, such as initial appearance or 
complaint) applies, in the federal system it emphatically does not.  Sixth Amendment 
attachment in federal criminal prosecutions comes only at indictment or waiver 
thereof.  So every federal defendant arrested on a complaint (which is, in some 
districts, for example the southwest border, virtually every defendant) and appointed 
counsel at his initial appearance has a two-week or so window during which he is 
represented, but he does not yet have Sixth Amendment rights.  In California, the 
prosecutor’s no-contact obligation has not yet “entified” during that period.  And this 
window would cover every Montejo situation—viz.: where the defendant waived 
Miranda and made an initial statement, and then the detectives want to follow up 
again after the initial appearance. 
The window could also stretch to some Shatzer scenarios, because the maximum 
period between arrest and indictment is thirty days,123 and can be extended further in 
certain circumstances.124  Thus, where the defendant is arrested on a complaint, 
invokes, is appointed counsel, then makes bail and is released from custody, I think 
the answer has to be the same once two weeks have passed, because a Shatzer 
defendant with two weeks of freedom is a Montejo defendant.    
The hard issues will arise upon indictment, when the Sixth Amendment attaches 
and the prosecutor’s ethical obligation entifies.  The ABA model rule explicitly 
limits the scope of the “authorized by law” exception to pre-attachment contacts.125   
Montejo and Shatzer now allow for post-attachment contact in particular 
circumstances.  Of course, a legislature or bar committee could revise the rule or 
commentary to include a Montejo/Shatzer post-attachment exception.  But until that 
happens, prosecutors should be cautious, because the argument that the exception 
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 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085, 2087 (citations omitted). 
 
123
 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). 
 
124
 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (setting out conditions for the exclusion of time). 
 
125
 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (“Communications authorized by law 
may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, 
directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil 
enforcement proceedings.”).  
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naturally arises from the cases is quite weak.  I think that post-attachment, the limits 
of action for police now diverge from those of prosecutors.  I further believe that 
every prosecutor’s office in the country will come to the same conclusion, and so we 
will have to deal with this divergence unless and until it is addressed legislatively.   
V.  DIVERGING INCENTIVES AND THE POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONSHIP 
I doubt that any such expansion of the exception for post-attachment contacts is 
likely to be forthcoming, whether from the legislature or the courts.  Legislatures are 
slow to act and are historically protective of attorneys’ privileges and prerogatives.126  
Direct contact with a represented, opposing party, authorized by a government 
lawyer, after initiation of adversarial proceedings is too much for courts and bar 
committees to force into the “authorized by law” exception.  We may well get 
decisions saying flatly: Post-attachment Montejo/Shatzer contacts are unethical.  
And of course, until the courts say something, there’s the uncomfortable legal terrain 
of uncertainty, which prosecutors across the country are now trying to navigate.  
The problem, however, is that from the moment these cases were decided there 
ceased to be, as the Montejo Court emphatically told us, any reason at all for the 
police themselves not to make these contacts.  The Court dismissed any suggestion 
that the ethical rules governing prosecutors should have any relevance to its decision 
at all.  
Thus these cases force on us the immediate and vexing problem of the police-
prosecutor relationship.  As a legal matter, to what extent is the prosecutor ethically 
responsible for the conduct of law-enforcement officers and agents?  And as 
practical matter, to what extent can the prosecutor in fact control the conduct of law-
enforcement officers and agents?  The prosecutor must supervise investigations, but 
is not in a direct chain of command with the enforcement agencies.127  This is true at 
the state and federal levels and makes all the more frustrating the Supreme Court’s 
unwillingness in Montejo and Shatzer to engage with the practical realities of 
criminal investigation.  I will argue that the practical realities of criminal 
investigation require—as a policy matter if not as a constitutional matter—that the 
ethical rules on contact with defendants be the same for police and agents as for 
prosecutors.  We could bring the prosecutors’ standard “down” or the cops’ standard 
“up,” but we have to do one or the other. 
Several broad features of the police-prosecutor relationship bear emphasis in this 
context.  First, prosecutors are charged with supervising criminal investigations and 
                                                          
 
126
 This makes sense since legislatures are largely made up of lawyers, and generally favor 
rules protective of the profession, as Charles Black has famously argued in the context of 
evidentiary privileges.  See Charles Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges–A Reprint of 
a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 50 (1975). 
[A]s a lawyer, I own I find it embarrassing that a group of lawyers, having so 
summarily dealt with the privacies of marriage and medicine, proceed, without any 
satisfactory explanation of the vast difference, to shield our own profession so amply.  
I wonder what kind of Rules we would have gotten if the doctors had drawn them.  
Id. at 50.  It’s important to note that while legislatures are traditionally no friend of criminal 
defendants, this no-contact rule is about the lawyers, not the perps.  Id. at 50. 
 
127
 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755-56 (2003). 
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are held accountable for the conduct of police and agents working their cases.  
Second, the police and agents working a case are not under the direct control of the 
assigned prosecutor, and the agencies themselves are not, with very few exceptions, 
under the direct supervision of the prosecuting office.  Third, prosecutors, as 
attorneys, have independent cultural ties and professional obligations that may not 
always align with those of police and agents. 
A.  Agency Priorities 
Prosecutors supervise criminal investigations.  They do not simply take cases in, 
fully made out and wrapped up in a red ribbon.  As a matter of policy and of 
practice, prosecutors are involved in both proactive (pre-arrest) and reactive (post-
arrest) investigations from the earliest stage possible.  Indeed, prosecutorial 
involvement in police investigations is a key component in the modern 
professionalization of law enforcement and the great reductions in police corruption 
and brutality.  And courts hold prosecutors responsible for law-enforcement conduct 
in myriad ways.  
Furthermore, prosecutors do not directly control enforcement resources.  There 
are overlapping chains of authority.  This is not like civil litigation, where the 
investigators are direct employees of the lawyers.  In the federal system, for 
example, investigating agents work for a number of different agencies, some of 
which are under the umbrella of DOJ, and some of which are not.  And even 
agencies that are within DOJ, notably the FBI, are notoriously independent.  In state 
systems, likewise, police departments do not answer directly to district attorneys’ 
offices. 
Further complicating matters, some agencies, again paradigmatically the FBI, 
have multiple priorities, some of which diverge from the prosecutor’s goal of 
charging and convicting perpetrators of crime.  The FBI has security and 
intelligence-gathering missions as well, which have repeatedly led to practices—
warrantless wiretapping, black bag searches, facilitation of and participation in 
organized crime, long-term cultivation of criminals as informants—inimical to the 
development of admissible evidence.128  This institutional duality has only been 
magnified in the post-9/11 era, as the Bureau has shifted large numbers of agencies 
to counterterrorism work where intelligence, rather than convictions, is the primary 
goal.  
A similar duality is present in many local police departments, which may 
measure public-safety success in terms of, for example, the number of guns or 
amount of drugs seized, rather than in convictions.  If the goal is to seize guns rather 
                                                          
 
128
 This duality has been present since the creation of the FBI, and has manifested itself in 
the Bureau’s approach to organized crime, civil rights, and communism.  See generally, e.g., 
RHODRI JEFFRYS-JONES, THE FBI: A HISTORY (2007).  Intelligence-gathering and prosecution 
of crimes are notoriously incompatible bedfellows.  Most recently, and strikingly, after 9/11 
the Bureau explicitly announced its focus on intelligence and security rather than prosecution.  
See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of 
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004) (“Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and 
F.B.I. Director Robert S. Mueller III have repeatedly said that they view preventing another 
terror attack as their main priority, rather than securing criminal convictions.”); Robert S. 
Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Speech at Stanford Law School (Oct. 18, 2002) (announcing that 
“in the wake of September 11, our first and abiding priority, plain and simple, is 
counterterrorism”).   
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than to prosecute illegal possessors, the incentives with regard to stop-and-frisk 
policies will obviously be different.  A constitutionally over-broad stop-and-frisk 
policy will seize a lot of guns; many of those stopped will, however, have 
meritorious suppression claims, so the charges will go nowhere.  But return of 
contraband is not a remedy, so the gun is off the streets.  The most dramatic example 
of this calibration of incentives was the NYPD’s Street Crimes Unit in the Guiliani 
Administration.129       
B.  Training, Supervision, and Direction 
If Montejo/Shatzer contacts are held to violate the no-contact rules, then clearly a 
prosecutor could not, in a particular case, direct an agent to engage in such contacts.  
But the situation is more complicated, because the prosecutor’s professional 
relationship with law enforcement agents is not one of boss and employee. 
Consider the central, and vital, prosecutorial function of advising agents on the 
legal limits of investigatory tactics.  Training law-enforcement officers on 
constitutional developments is a key prosecutorial function; so is answering legal 
questions posed by law enforcement.  Sooner or later, one way or another, word will 
filter down through the ranks that the Supreme Court has cleared the way for 
renewed contact in these two situations.  If leading a training on new Miranda 
developments, or if asked by an agent what the cases held, a prosecutor could, no 
doubt, ethically explain the rules announced by the cases.  The governing regulation 
for federal attorneys distinguishes prosecutorial training and advice-giving from 
supervision and direction.130  But where, in the context of working a case together, is 
the line between explaining the rule announced by the cases (okay), and suggesting, 
advising, authorizing, or ratifying the contact (not okay)? 
Here’s an example: The (pre-Montejo) FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents 
includes131 the following directive:    
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 See, e.g., David Kocienewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1.  
Some street crimes officers also said they felt pressured by the department’s emphasis 
on crime statistics, and that they are forced to adhere to an unwritten quota system that 
demands that each officer seize at least one gun a month.  “There are guys who are 
willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,” said an officer, 
who spoke on the condition of anonymity.  “We frisk 20, maybe 30 people a day.  Are 
they all by the book?  Of course not; it’s safer and easier to just toss people.  And if 
it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun yet?  Things can get a little 
desperate.”   
Id. 
 
130
 28 C.F.R. § 77.4(f) (2010).  
Investigative Agents. A Department attorney shall not direct an investigative agent 
acting under the attorney’s supervision to engage in conduct under circumstances that 
would violate the attorney’s obligations under section 530B.  A Department attorney 
who in good faith provides legal advice or guidance upon request to an investigative 
agent should not be deemed to violate these rules. 
Id. 
 
131
 Or, at least, the version on the Bureau’s public FOIA page does.  Whether it has been 
revised in response to Montejo, I don’t know. 
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If an accused, during the course of an initial appearance or other court 
proceeding, requests to be represented by legal counsel or accepts the 
court appointment of counsel, no interview of the accused may take place 
concerning the charge for which the accused has appeared in court unless  
(a) the accused’s counsel is present; or  
(b) the accused initiates the contact . . . or  
(c) contact is necessary to acquire information critical to life . . . or  
(d) the contact has been approved by the United State’s Attorney’s 
office.132 
 
It would appear that the Handbook was written to comply with the prevailing 
constitutional rules, because it directly tracks the pre-Montejo law.  Now, however, 
after Montejo, the manual is more restrictive than the prevailing constitutional rule.  
Subsection (d) makes clear that consultation with the AUSA is expected in 
ambiguous circumstances. 
So what happens when an FBI agent comes to an AUSA and says, “Hey, look, 
the Manual says no contact after counsel’s been appointed, but I heard about this 
new case, and I went to my SAC, and he said go ask the AUSA”?  That is exactly 
what one would expect, and hope for, in a professional law enforcement agency.  So 
you’re the AUSA: What do you say?  Assume the no-contact rule applies: Either 
you’re post-attachment or you’re in a state where the rule applies pre-attachment.  
Do you say, “Well, yes, you are constitutionally permitted to do it, and I am 
permitted to tell you that you are constitutionally permitted to do it, but I am not 
ethically permitted to direct you to do it”?  (And of course you both know that it 
could help your case.) 
The agent leaves your office and does the interview.  He gets a good waiver and 
then a solid, incriminating statement from the defendant.  You call defense counsel: 
“Let’s talk about your plea; your guy just confessed.”  Defense counsel finds out 
what happened, starts yelling, then files an ethics complaint against you.  Are you in 
trouble or not? 
Or take a typical state case, where the police are working largely independently.  
A detective goes out and does the interview without asking the prosecutor first and 
then brings the statement to the prosecutor for use at trial.  Ex hypothesi, the 
detective was not directed by the prosecutor to do the interview.  Nor are all the 
detective’s actions imputed to the prosecutor as a matter of law, because the 
detective is not the prosecutor’s employee and works for a separate agency with an 
independent interest in interviewing the suspect.  As explained above, in the normal 
investigatory hierarchy, the prosecutor lacks the power to expressly forbid the 
contact.  Nor is it likely that the prosecutor would be able to preemptively urge the 
police not to do the interview, because law enforcement officers or agents are 
virtually always working a case before a prosecutor is assigned to it.  Given the 
legality of the contact, and the possibility of other agency priorities (for example, 
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 FBI LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, 7-4.1(7), available at http://www.fbi.gov 
(search “Legal Handbook for Special Agents” in the search bar; click on the first link; click on 
hyperlink that reads “Legal Handbook for Special Agents (Released 2003)”).  Exceptions (b) 
and (c) are the standard Edwards and Quarles exceptions.  Exception (d) is a trickier case; the 
handbook says it concerns “extenuating circumstances such as defense counsel’s involvement 
in the criminal offense or other serious conflicts of interest.”  Id. 
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intelligence gathering or seizure of weapons), it’s likely that agents may have 
reasons for wanting to engage in these contacts even if told by the prosecutor to lay 
off. 
The question is whether in any of these situations—where the prosecutor gives 
accurate legal advice knowing that the agent will follow it, but does not direct the 
agent to do so; where the prosecutor gives no advance direction but then later uses 
the evidence; or where the prosecutor issues a no-contact order that the agents 
disregard, and then uses the fruits of their contact—the prosecutor has violated his 
ethical duty and is subject to sanction.  There would obviously be no constitutional 
barrier to the introduction of the evidence; the only question would be whether the 
prosecutor would risk bar discipline.133   
It is at least arguable that trial use could constitute ratification.134  Prosecutors 
have been held to have ratified police conduct by exploiting it after the fact.135  And 
certainly as an institutional matter, one could argue that the regular use by 
prosecutors of constitutionally obtained evidence that they could not ethically 
participate in gathering would seem to be a de facto ratification of the police practice 
of gathering the evidence.  If we were dealing with corporate responsibility for 
employee actions, liability would be fairly clear.136 
But we’re not.  And that fact makes this a more difficult problem than the usual 
“see no evil” dilemma in criminal investigation, which arises when a prosecutor 
doesn’t ask questions about agents’ methods, and thus gets a reputation as a go-to 
guy for agents inclined to use unsavory or illegal tactics.  It is more difficult because, 
first, in this case, the “evil” is not actually evil—the cop who does a Montejo/Shatzer 
interview and gets a statement has done nothing wrong—and second, the ethical 
analysis on imputed responsibility is much less clear for criminal investigation than 
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 Every court that has considered this issue has said suppression wouldn’t be an 
appropriate remedy even if the conduct was unethical.  See, e.g., Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840; 
Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464. 
 
134
 This is arguable, but by no means certain.  See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, n.55 (1995) (stating that the use of evidence is not 
ratification if the attorney was not involved in improper acquisition).  
 
135
 See, e.g., Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 458 (holding that prosecutor ratified police officer’s 
action in interviewing suspect outside the presence of counsel by failing to terminate the 
interview after learning of it, and thereby violated no-contact rule).  
 
136
 See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating a corporation 
cannot “avoid liability by adopting abstract rules” that forbid its agents from engaging in 
illegal acts, because “[e]ven a specific directive to an agent or employee or honest efforts to 
police such rules do not automatically free the company for the wrongful acts of agents”); 
United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] corporation may 
be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were 
acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the 
corporation, even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions.”); 
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[A] corporation may be liable for 
acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but . . . the existence 
of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in 
fact acted to benefit the corporation.”); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 
1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that a corporation “could not gain exculpation by issuing general 
instructions without undertaking to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with 
the obvious risks”). 
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for civil litigation.  In sharp distinction from civil litigation, in criminal investigation 
the agents don’t work for the lawyers.  Dan Richman puts his finger on it: “One 
often hears rookie prosecutors refer to ‘my agents.’  Most soon learn to drop the 
possessive.”137 
Prosecutorial insistence on agency abstention from perfectly legal, 
investigatively valuable tactics is a recipe for open conflict with the agency, 
concomitant lack of agency cooperation, and—worse—lack of full disclosure to the 
prosecutor about agents’ investigative activities.138  Such lack of disclosure can lead 
to myriad ethical and constitutional violations, which is why achieving close 
prosecutorial supervision of investigations from as early on as possible is the policy 
of the Justice Department.  The best way to thwart this policy is to drive a wedge 
between the incentives of the two institutions.  Richman’s reaction to the McDade 
Amendment presciently anticipates the Montejo/Shatzer problem: 
[A] significant regulatory gap has now been created between prosecutors 
and agents, as agents, not bound by the ethics rules, remain free to contact 
represented targets overtly and covertly, so long as they do not involve 
prosecutors in such endeavors. . . . To the extent one’s goal is to ensure 
prosecutorial involvement in investigative decisionmaking, the McDade 
Amendment and the unreflective application of ethical rules governing 
investigations to prosecutors generally are thus large steps in the wrong 
direction (and unlikely to prove effective in restraining investigative 
contacts with represented parties).139  
When Professor Richman wrote the above, Jackson was still the law, Edwards 
was still unlimited temporally, and agents were thus barred from initiating custodial 
contact in Montejo and Shatzer situations.  Montejo and Shatzer drive the wedge 
even deeper, and put the prosecutor in a very difficult ethical position.  The 
competent prosecutor is on notice of Supreme Court case law, and is on notice of 
what the investigating agents are doing.  Thus the situation will arise, for example, in 
which a defendant has invoked and is out on bail, and the agents—who will 
themselves almost certainly be aware of Shatzer—propose going to talk to him to 
see if they can coax a waiver out of him now that he’s free.  The agents tell the 
prosecutor their plan.  What should the prosecutor tell them?  This is a real dilemma.  
One horn is the ethical rule: no contact.  There is no way around that one—if you’re 
doing your job, the agents will ask you before they buttonhole the guy, and you’re 
on the hook if you authorize or ratify: You are in charge now, and these guys are 
“your” agents as far as the rule is concerned.  
The other horn is that the Court has just said it is perfectly legal for the agents to 
go out and make contact.  There is no reason for the cops not to do it.   
                                                          
 
137
 Richman, supra note 127, at 756.  I should note that I was lucky enough to work in an 
office that provided good training and mentoring on the subtleties of the prosecutor-agent 
relationship, but I still tripped over this locution, and its analogous practical manifestations, 
from time to time.  One quickly learns the difference between making suggestions and giving 
orders.  
 
138
 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 128, at 1268 (considering the problem of internal agency 
regulation of police conduct in light of the fact that internal regulations are unenforceable by 
the courts). 
 
139
 Richman, supra note 127, at 821-22.  
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Many lawyers would here interject, “So what!  There’s no dilemma.  You tell 
them not to do it.  Period.”  I sympathize with the sentiment, I think, but it’s not that 
simple.  The prosecutor has a duty to—and surely, is ethically permitted to—
accurately explain constitutional case law to law enforcement personnel.  So say 
you’re doing training for investigative agents.  I think you have to talk about 
Montejo and Shatzer, and you have to say: “This is legal.  You may approach, you 
may ask for a waiver, and if you get one the evidence will come in.”  You then say 
(presumably): “Prosecutors are bound by rules of attorney ethics, which clearly 
forbid this contact, whether in person or by proxy.”  I think you have to say both, or 
you are misleading the agents. 
Then you finish the training session and you leave, and the agent bosses sit 
around and plan strategy.  They’re not dumb: They have to recognize that the 
Supreme Court is inviting them to do this.  So the agents come up with their own 
policy: You can do this, but you can’t tell the prosecutor about it first.    
Assume the agents develop this strategy.  It seems to me it works once.  The first 
time it happens, the prosecutor bosses will have a talk with the agent bosses.  And 
once they do, all the prosecutors are now on notice of the agents’ strategy, and thus 
extremely vulnerable to ethics charges if they exploit Montejo or Shatzer statements.  
So what do you do?  Do you call in your agents and have everyone sign a document 
memorializing your direct order not to do Shatzer waiver requests?  And suppose the 
agents do it anyway, after signing?  The evidence is admissible, sure, but are you 
still on the hook ethically?  Again, I think that gambit works only once.   
Furthermore, what kind of relationship can you have with the investigating 
agents if you’re giving an express instruction to refrain from an action and they’re 
ignoring you?  I for one would not want to be the prosecutor arguing to the ethics 
board that I should not be held accountable for what my agents did, because hey, 
they just ignore my instructions.140  Either the arrangement was a sham, or I am an 
incompetent prosecutor and have only saved my ethics bacon by declaring my 
professional ineptitude.  
There is some evidence that the possibility of sanctions for prosecutors can 
meaningfully constrain agent investigatory behavior.  In 2000, the Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the Oregon ethics rule that prohibited deception by attorneys 
prohibited all lawyers—including prosecutors—from supervising undercover 
                                                          
 
140
 This was the trap Tom Cruise set for Jack Nicholson in “A Few Good Men,” which I 
can’t resist quoting here.   
[Nicholson]: Ever put your life in another man’s hands, ask him to put his life in 
yours?  [Cruise]: No, sir.  [Nicholson]: We follow orders, son.  We follow orders or 
people die.  It’s that simple. Are we clear? . . . .  [Cruise]: Colonel, I have just one 
more question.  Why, if you gave an order that Santiago wasn’t to be touched, and 
your orders are always followed, then why would he be in danger, why would it be 
necessary to transfer him off the base?  [Nicholson]: Sometimes men take matters into 
their own hands.  [Cruise]: No sir.  You made it clear just a moment ago that your men 
never take matters into their own hands.  Your men follow orders or people die.  So 
Santiago shouldn’t have been in any danger at all, should he have, Colonel? 
[Nicholson]: You little bastard.  
A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992), available at 
http://www.godamongdirectors.com/scripts/fewgood.shtml. 
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investigations.141  The Oregon legislature subsequently revised the rule to allow for 
supervision of undercover investigations, but the revision did not take effect until 
2002, and in the interim undercover investigation largely stopped in the state.142     
Professor Lininger argues that because prosecutors are so central to modern 
criminal investigations, ethical restrictions on prosecutors’ conduct can meaningfully 
control the conduct of investigating agencies:  
 
[C]lose cooperation between prosecutors and police would persist even if 
prosecutors are subject to stricter rules than police . . . [because] police 
need prosecutors to unlock the door to the closet where the most valuable 
investigative tools are kept: wiretaps, FISA warrants, grand jury 
investigations, plea agreements offering leniency in exchange for 
cooperation, etc.143 
 
 Lininger is arguing for revisions of state ethics rules to prohibit suspicionless 
infiltration of religious groups, a practice that, like Montejo and Shatzer contacts, is 
otherwise legal.  His point is simple: If prosecutors won’t touch the evidence the 
police generate, the police won’t bother generating it.  Perhaps that dynamic will 
prevail in Montejo and Shatzer scenarios.  Time will tell.144  
VI.  PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENDANTS 
Finally, will there be dire consequences as police and prosecutors put the new 
cases into practice?  Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent in Montejo that 
“generations of police officers have been trained to refrain from approaching 
represented defendants.”145  His point was simply that Jackson was not 
“unworkable,” which is certainly true.  Nor will Montejo prove “unworkable” as 
successive police academy classes cut their teeth on its rule rather than Jackson’s.  
The salient question is whether Montejo’s practical consequences will be significant 
and bad.  
                                                          
 
141
 See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000). 
 
142
 See Lininger, supra note 128, at 1273-74; Gatti, 8 P.3d at 976.  Lininger comments that 
“for the two-year period in which ‘the Gatti rule’ remained in effect, proactive criminal 
investigations ground to a halt in Oregon” and quotes a federal official publicly proclaiming 
the rule’s effect: “F.B.I. Agent Nancy Savage, the Special Agent in Charge of the F.B.I. office 
in Eugene, Oregon, commented on a national television broadcast that the Gatti rule had ‘shut 
down major undercover operations’ in Oregon.”  Lininger, supra note 128, at 1274-75.  
 
143
 Lininger, supra note 128, at 1274. 
 
144
 Richman illustrates this general dynamic with an example from Great Britain.  A judge 
dismissed a criminal charge in a case in which the police, unbeknownst to and unauthorized 
by the prosecution, had promised immunity.  The prosecution argued that the promise had 
been made before any prosecutors were even involved with the investigation, but the High 
Court was unmoved: “If the Crown Prosecution Service find that their powers are being 
usurped by the police, the remedy must surely be a greater degree of liaison at an early stage.”  
Richman, supra note 127, at 781 (quoting R. v. Croydon Justices ex rel. Dean, [1993] 3 All 
E.R. 129, 135).  And embroiling a prosecutor in an ethics investigation is far worse than 
getting one case dismissed. 
 
145
 Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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On this question I am provisionally inclined to say no.  It remains true that when 
a suspect invokes his right to counsel in a Miranda setting, the police are obligated 
to cease questioning, are trained to cease questioning, and generally do cease 
questioning.  And Edwards still bars re-initiation after invocation if the defendant 
remains in custody.  Montejo changes only the answer to the question whether the 
police may still request a waiver when the suspect has not yet invoked, but has been 
appointed counsel.  It changes nothing substantively about the interaction between 
the police and the defendant, and it is undisputed that the police already had the 
authority to seek a post-arrest Miranda waiver, even if the suspect had already hired 
a lawyer.  So the practical effect will be only in situations where the defendant has 
either already waived and made a statement, or has neither waived nor invoked 
because the police have not yet had time to question him, and is, at the time of 
appointment, willing to make further statements to the police, but would change his 
mind if his attorney was present. 
To be sure, this is not by any means a trivial set of defendants.  Any competent 
defense attorney will tell his client not to say anything, and not to say anything more 
if he’s already made statements, until the attorney can assess the strength of the 
government’s case.  It is reasonable to think that some unknown but not insignificant 
percentage of defendants who would otherwise have talked would decide to clam up 
after being so advised by counsel.  So the practical effect of Montejo is likely to be 
to produce, at this margin, somewhat more confessions than would be produced by 
the Jackson rule.   
However, these are all confessions that by hypothesis would have been made 
anyway but for an accident of timing—either the defendant had not yet been 
interviewed at all, or he had but his statements were incomplete.  In the former case, 
the defendant in a Montejo scenario who does not want to talk need only do what 
any pre-appointment defendant need do: invoke.  In the latter case, the defendant has 
already made the decision to waive and give a statement.  So there is no new set of 
defendants who will attempt to exercise their rights but will be unable to do so under 
the new rule.  In that respect, Montejo is perhaps less significant—and less 
troubling—than cases like Butler146 and Davis,147 which did have the effect of 
rendering some defendants’ attempts to invoke ineffective.   
So the Montejo bottom line is likely to be that defendants who waive in a 
Montejo setting would have waived pre-appointment too, as indeed Montejo himself 
did.  The result changes only for those defendants who would have been persuaded 
by counsel not to waive.  Are they being unfairly penalized by the Montejo rule, or 
did they, rather, previously enjoy an unwarranted windfall under the Jackson rule?  
Miranda itself suggests the latter interpretation, I think.  After all, Miranda did not 
hold that no custodial interrogation can take place without the suspect having a 
lawyer present.  The Court could have announced such a rule, but it has never done 
so.  The government, in short, gets one bite at the waiver apple and does not have to 
go through counsel to get its bite.  Every criminal suspect has to face the 
waiver/invocation decision alone, once.  
                                                          
 
146
 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (recognizing implicit Miranda waiver 
and declining to impose express waiver requirement). 
 
147
 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requiring express statement for invocation 
of Miranda rights and declining to find implicit invocation). 
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That, at least, was a fair statement of the law up until Shatzer, which adds: unless 
the suspect is out of custody, in which case the suspect has to face the 
waiver/invocation decision alone, once every two weeks, if he is re-arrested.  Will 
this holding create major upheaval?  Again, I am inclined to doubt it.  While the 
suspect is free, there isn’t any custodial interrogation: The defendant out on bail can 
walk away, or close his door, or say “No, thank you.”148  By definition, a defendant 
out on bail has no Edwards protections: The police can always approach him and ask 
whether he wants to talk.  Edwards only barred re-initiation of custodial 
interrogation.  So for Shatzer to apply, a defendant has to be released and then, after 
two weeks, re-arrested for something else.  That’s not an unheard-of occurrence, to 
be sure, but it certainly doesn’t happen in the majority of criminal cases.  
Furthermore, in the Shatzer situation, we have a defendant who knows his rights, 
has been told his rights not just by the police, but by a judge, and subsequently 
(presumably) by his own attorney.  It would be absurd to describe a Shatzer 
defendant who waived on a second or third custodial contact as being unaware of his 
right not to talk to the police: First, he has to be re-Mirandized, and second, by 
hypothesis this person has been arrested, was Mirandized, invoked, had an initial 
appearance, got a lawyer, made bail, and then was released.  His own experience has 
just proved that you can invoke and the invocation will be honored: By hypothesis 
this person has already resisted the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation.  
And the Shatzer court emphasized that Edwards continues to prohibit badgering.149  
As long as the regular biweekly arrests are based on probable cause, then they’re 
unlikely to be found to be badgering under Whren.150  Of course, the claim could be 
made—but the point is that in such a scenario, the proper target of the defendant’s 
ire would be Whren, not Shatzer. 
So, as a purely predictive matter, I don’t think the sky will fall here for 
defendants.  I think Jackson was a workable rule but Montejo will be too.  And I 
don’t think that putting a time limit on Edwards for non-custodial defendants will 
have significant impacts on investigations.  Its impact on the relationship between 
police and prosecutors, however, could be significant. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As noted above, there’s a very strong argument that the no-contact rule is too 
close to the heart of legal ethics for Montejo/Shatzer contacts to be permissible.  The 
rule is central to the professional identity of every lawyer, and rightly so: Channeling 
communications through the lawyers is the only way to make any litigation work.  
Criminal practice is no exception.  Overtly contacting a represented, opposing party 
                                                          
 
148
 I say all this with a full awareness of the hollowness of much of the Court’s consent 
jurisprudence and the strong criticisms thereof made by David Cole and many others.  See, 
e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 17-22 (1999) (criticizing the Court’s consent cases).  Still, the sharpest criticism of the 
consent cases is that consent may be found even where the suspect did not know he had the 
right to refuse the search request.  See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  
However much contemporary interrogation jurisprudence has chipped away at Miranda’s 
foundations, it remains true that no admissible custodial interrogation can proceed absent the 
suspect’s knowledge of the right not to participate.  
 
149
 See, e.g., Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 
150
 Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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and asking him to talk to you without his attorney present might just be too much for 
any court to countenance.151 
If so, the question arises about the best administrative and legislative response.  
Richman argues that, in some contexts, judicial enforcement of strong constructive 
agency presumptions can have salutary results:  
Those states that treat police and prosecutors as independent actors in the 
plea agreement context would do well to reconsider a framework that 
seems blind to the virtues of coordination within the enforcement 
bureaucracy.  Here again, as we saw in the Brady context, treating the 
“government” as a single unit when it comes to defendants’ rights makes 
it more likely that enforcers will productively collaborate.152 
I’ve gone back and forth on this a bit, but I think I am now settled on the view 
that the no-contact rule is too integral to the practice of law to be discarded in 
Montejo/Shatzer contexts.  I do not think courts will or should extend the exception 
for undercover contacts to Montejo/Shatzer contacts without legislative revision of 
the rules. 
The rationale for allowing prosecutorial supervision of pre-attachment 
undercover investigations makes sense: First, pre-attachment, it’s not necessarily 
clear153 what the “subject matter of the representation” is—the defendant may 
suspect that he’s a target, but has no way of knowing what he’ll ultimately be 
charged with.  Second, the type of contact at issue—“false friend” contact by an 
informant or an agent posing as a co-conspirator—is not the kind of contact 
contemplated by the no-contact rule. 
Montejo/Shatzer contexts are different on both scores.  There is a subject matter 
of the representation—the defendant has been charged and has counsel representing 
him on that charge.  And while a cop’s request for a Miranda waiver is not “lawyerly 
wiles” exactly, it’s surely closer to legalese than a conversation with someone you 
think is just one of your conspirators.154  And it is hard to imagine a decision as to 
which defense counsel’s advice is more valuable than the decision whether or not to 
make a statement.  Indeed, in my experience, the Miranda waiver decision is 
functionally the decision about whether to plead.155 
The simplest solution, doctrinally at any rate, would be for state legislatures to 
revise the ethics rules to explicitly include Montejo/Shatzer contacts in the 
“authorized by law” exception.  I don’t think this is going to happen, however.  So 
the best option for prosecutors will be to insist that agents and officers not take 
advantage of the Montejo/Shatzer holdings.  Prosecutors should explain to their 
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 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 1999). 
 
152
 Richman, supra note 127, at 829-30. 
 
153
 Often, it is clear–—but this is a legal fiction, and my point is just that it’s at least 
coherent in theory. 
 
154
 This is especially true when the officers say—as they are perfectly entitled to do—
things like: “If you have anything to tell us, this might be your only chance.”   
 
155
 To be sure, some defendants waive, make a statement denying guilt, then go to trial, but 
that’s relatively rare.  Usually the ones that go to trial invoke, and the ones that talk plead.  
This is, I’ve always imagined, one of the biggest frustrations (among many) of defense 
practice: Often, your client has already confessed by the time you’re appointed. 
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agents and officers that any investigative activity ultimately aimed at proving a 
suspect’s guilt in court is potentially, and reasonably, chargeable to the prosecutor.  
Since the prosecutor is the one who will ultimately have to take responsibility for the 
agents’ conduct, the agents should not violate the no-contact rule.  And in order to 
credibly rebut allegations of sub rosa encouragement of the practice, prosecutors 
should announce—and follow—a policy of not using statements obtained in 
violation of the rule.156 
 
                                                          
 
156
 Indeed, DOJ did this preemptively in its Montejo brief, in which it stated that regardless 
of the Montejo holding, federal agents would not interview suspects in Montejo scenarios.  See 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Michigan v. Jackson at 
11-12, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 1019983. 
[A]lthough federal law enforcement agents generally are not constrained by the ethical 
rules that apply to prosecutors, law enforcement interests are not well-served when 
law enforcement agents have an incentive to communicate with represented 
defendants without direction from prosecutors.  Accordingly, even if this Court were 
to overrule Jackson, that decision likely would not significantly alter the manner in 
which federal law enforcement agents investigate indicted defendants. 
Id. 
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